Monday, March 19, 2018
Professor Demleitner publishes op-ed in Richmond Times-Dispatch
Washington and Lee law professor Nora V. Demleitner published an op-ed piece in the Richmond Times-Dispatch. The piece, titled “Let’s celebrate family migration – and quit calling it ‘chain’ migration” appeared on March 2, 2018. Read the op-ed online here.
Monday, March 12, 2018
Professor Kish Parella Presents at the BYU Winter Deals Conference
On Thursday, March 1, 2018 Professor Kish Parella presented her work in progress, Public Relations Litigation, at the BYU Winter Deals Conference that “brings leading scholars and practitioners to Park City, UT to discuss the modern global economy’s most pressing legal issues.” Professor Parella presented on a panel exploring issues in corporate governance. An abstract of … Continue reading Professor Kish Parella Presents at the BYU Winter Deals Conference
Wednesday, February 07, 2018
Professor Russell Miller to be featured at Virginia Festival of the Book
Washington and Lee law professor Russell Miller will speak at this year’s Virginia Festival of the Book. He will participate in a panel titled Surveillance vs. Privacy: NSA, DARPA, and More which features his book Privacy and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue in the Shadow of the NSA-Affair. The panel will take place on Friday, March 23, 2018. … Continue reading Professor Russell Miller to be featured at Virginia Festival of the Book
Tuesday, January 30, 2018
Professor Rendleman Leading Remedies Scholar in Digital Commons Network
Washington and Lee Law Professor Doug Rendleman is a leading scholar in the area of Remedies in the Digital Commons Network. Of the 1,155 authors in this disciple, Professor Rendleman’s work receives some of the highest downloads. To date, his work has been downloaded 15,841 times. Some of Professor Rendleman’s most recent works include: … Continue reading Professor Rendleman Leading Remedies Scholar in Digital Commons Network
Thursday, January 18, 2018
Christopher Seaman Publishes New Work in BTLJ
Washington and Lee law professor Christopher Seaman has published a new work in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal. The article is titled “Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret Law” and was written with co-author Sharon K. Sandeen of Mitchell Hamline Law School. The article appears in volume 32 of the journal. The full text is available … Continue reading Christopher Seaman Publishes New Work in BTLJ
January 29 - Judith Resnick et al.
Brief for Amici Curiae Constitutional Law, Federal Courts, Citizen, and Remedies Scholars in Support of Respondent: Lynch v. Morales-Santana
January 22 - Margaret Hu
Orwell's 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test
This Article describes a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test under the Fourth Amendment that is grounded in evolving customary law to replace the reasonable expectation of privacy test formulated in Katz v. United States. To illustrate how customary law norms are shaping modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this Article examines the recurrence of judicial references to George Orwell’s novel, 1984, within the Fourth Amendment context when federal courts have assessed the constitutionality of modern surveillance methods. The Supreme Court has indicated that the Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine must now evolve to impose meaningful limitations on the intrusiveness of new surveillance technologies.
A cybersurveillance nonintrusion test implicitly suggested by the Supreme Court in United States v. Jones first shifts the vantage point of the Fourth Amendment analysis from an individual-based tangible harm inquiry to an inquiry of a society-wide intangible harm— whether the modern surveillance method creates a “1984 problem” for society. A cybersurveillance nonintrusion test requires the government to justify the intrusion of the surveillance on society. A new test would remediate increasingly ineffective Fourth Amendment jurisprudence currently grounded in property and tort law. The Article argues that the adoption of a cybersurveillance nonintrusion test and the abandonment of the current privacy test is not only required; but, in practice, is already used by the federal courts.
January 15 - Caroline L. Osborne et al.
Securing Professional Development: Getting to Yes
January 15 - Caroline L. Osborne
Ask a Director: Reporting Accomplishments
November 09 - Sarah C. Haan
Shareholder Proposal Settlements and the Private Ordering of Public Elections
Reform of campaign finance disclosure has stalled in Congress and at various federal agencies, but it is steadily unfolding in a firm-by-firm program of private ordering. Today, much of what is publicly known about how individual public companies spend money to influence federal, state, and local elections—and particularly what is known about corporate “dark money”—comes from disclosures that conform to privately negotiated contracts.
The primary mechanism for this new transparency is the settlement of the shareholder proposal, in which a shareholder trades its rights under SEC Rule 14a-8—and potentially the rights of other shareholders—for a privately negotiated social policy commitment by corporate management. Settlements of campaign finance disclosure proposals are memorialized in detailed private agreements that set the frequency, format, and substance of disclosure reports; are enforced by private actors; and typically are not available to other shareholders, corporate stakeholders, or the public. Proposal settlements are producing a body of private disclosure law that increases corporate transparency to advance First Amendment values and is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny. The disclosure standards themselves are a mixed bag: effective at filling some gaps in public campaign finance disclosure law, but inadequate to make corporate electoral spending transparent in advance of elections.
As a form of private electoral regulation, the proposal settlement mechanism raises issues of democratic transparency, participation, accountability, and enforcement. This Article challenges the characterization of proposal settlements as “voluntary” corporate self-regulation, provides a framework for understanding settlement-related agency costs, and shows how settlement subverts the traditional justifications for the shareholder proposal itself. Solutions that address the democratic and corporate governance problems of settlement largely overlap, suggesting a path forward.